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Risk Education 
A Worldview Analysis of What is Present and Could Be 
 
Gale L. Russell 
University of Regina, Canada 
 
Abstract: Risk, risk analysis, risk management and risk-based decision-making are ubiquitous ideas in the 
modern world. Consequently, risk education is emerging as a new field of research. However, just as the defining 
of risk and what it entails is a contested topic, so too is the field of risk education research open to many possible 
approaches. In this paper notions of risk, particularly as they play out in research on risk education, are analyzed 
(within an ethical space) using a theoretical framework based on the Traditional Western and an Indigenous 
worldview. Through this analysis, along with the identification of the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing 
currently being valued in the research, other kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that may prove just as 
important emerge. 
Keywords: decision-making, ethical space, indigenous, risk, risk Education, western, worldview. 
 
Introduction 
No matter how dominant a worldview is, there are always other ways of interpreting the 
world. Different ways of interpreting the world are manifest through different cultures, which 
are often in opposition to one another. One of the problems with colonialism is that it tries to 
maintain a singular social order by means of force and law, suppressing the diversity of 
human worldviews (Little Bear, 2000 p. 77). 
Risk, risk analysis, risk management and risk-based decision-making are ubiquitous ideas and 
terms in the modern world; however, what is meant by risk and how one can analyze, manage, or make 
decisions based upon risk remains, if not contended, then inconclusive. Borovcnik and Kapadia (2011), 
define risk as “a situation with inherent uncertainty about the (future) outcomes, which are related to 
impact (cost, damage, benefit)” (p. 5503), a definition which will work for the purpose of this paper. 
Within much of risk research, there is general agreement that “there are two levels of criteria for making 
decisions: personally preferred ones and rationally bound ones” (p. 5503). There even is agreement as to 
the origins of the knowledge held in relation to each of the criteria (affective/emotional responses and 
scientific methods, respectively); however, the perceived worth of each of these criteria by researchers is 
not so clear cut. Further, as with other emerging and prominent features of the modern world, like 
technology, there is a proclaimed need for the study of risk to be part of students’ educational 
experiences. Hence, the need to consider risk education: where does it belong, what should it look like, 
and how can it happen – researchers have begun to investigate this proposition. 
Concurrently, within another emerging area of research, it has been theorized that the grounding 
of the teaching and learning of mathematics within an Indigenous worldview (the transreform approach) 
has the potential to bring about changes that grounding within the Traditional Western worldview might 
not (Russell & Chernoff, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). Particularly, it has been proposed that such a 
change in worldview could result in the end of the Math Wars (Russell & Chernoff, 2013b); the 
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acceptance and implementation of research-supported approaches to the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, such as those related to constructivist learning theory (Russell & Chernoff, 2012); and to 
diminish, even eliminate, the marginalization of students (Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike) with 
respect to mathematics (Russell & Chernoff, 2012, 2013b). The goal of this paper is to provide an 
analysis as well as examples, which illustrate the importance of extending the current boundaries of risk 
education research to include considerations that emerge, yet untapped, through the analysis. The 
purpose of this paper is to use this same theoretical framework to analyze the existing risk education 
research in order to provide new insights into what has been considered and what has not. Further, 
through the use of particular examples of situations involving risk, an argument is made for how risk 
education could be strengthened in relation to this analysis.  
This paper begins with a brief discussion of key areas and ideas related to risk and risk 
education. Then, the aforementioned theoretical framework and an explanation of how it will be applied 
are described. From that point, the theoretical framework is used to analyze current research in risk 
education, highlighting what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are being valued, which are not 
being valued, and which remain hidden.  Finally, two examples of recent incidents and the risk 
knowledges that were valued and not valued within them are presented to demonstrate the importance, 
the possibilities, and the consequences of the analysis results. 
 
Risk in the Literature 
Existing research and theories about risk are abundant and variable. Within different fields 
(psychology, science, finance, politics, and medicine, to name but a few), much has been researched and 
written in relation to risk, risk analysis, risk management, and risk-based decision-making. As this paper 
is about risk education, it is fitting to present a synopsis of significant research studies investigating what 
risk education should include and how it should be carried out. Before such a discussion however, three 
other topics will be explored: the communicating of risk information, prominent theories about risk 
analysis and decision-making, and how risk is currently being incorporated into curricular (standards) 
documents. Whereas an understanding of what exists within theories of risk analysis and decision-
making provides a reference for what may be occurring pedagogically in risk education, a curricular 
analysis helps to provide a contextual perspective for how risk education is being related to curriculum 
content. The discussion of the communicating of risk information, which will be considered first, sheds 
light on what understandings students need to “survive” in our “risk-driven” world. 
Communicating about Risk 
Today, the assessment and management of risk, as well as the making of decisions with respect 
to risks involved, is found in nearly every facet of our lives, making the communication of risk-based 
information omnipresent. In relation to communication about risk, three aspects will be considered here: 
language issues, relative and absolute risk, and representational formats.  
Often, in an effort to clarify risk information, complex probabilistic relationships, calculations, 
and values are communicated instead through the use of adjectives: “probabilities can be described 
fluidly with words, using language that appeals to people’s intuition and emotion” (Spiegelhalter, 
Pearson, & Short, 2011, p. 1394). For example, in a Rapid Risk Assessment for the Ebola virus disease 
(EVD) in West Africa released by the European Centre for Disease Prevention on January 30, 2015 the 
following communication of a risk assessment was given: “The risk of EVD being imported into the EU 
or the risk of transmission occurring within the EU remains low or very low due to the range of risk 
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reduction measures that have been put in place by the Member States and the affected countries” (p. 2). 
Likewise, on February 11, 2015, Public Health England released a Risk Assessment of the Ebola virus 
disease outbreak in West Africa stating: “Despite the recent confirmation of the first Ebola virus disease 
(EVD) case diagnosed in the United Kingdom (UK), there is no change in the overall EVD risk 
assessment for the UK. While the risk of further EVD cases being imported into the UK is currently 
considered to be low, the risk of transmission occurring within the community in the UK is, and is 
expected to remain, very low due to the range of robust measures that have been put in place. There is 
still an expectation that a handful of cases may occur in the UK over the coming months” (p. 1).  It is 
important to note that although both risk assessments are addressing the same two risks, EVD entering a 
region from elsewhere and the spread of EVD within a region, there are differences in how the 
assessment of risk(s) is presented, and quite possibly how those risks are determined. In the case of the 
Public Health of England assessment, the risk of importing EVD into the UK and the risk of 
transmission of EVD within the UK are considered separately, giving two definitive appearing risk 
ratings of low and very low, respectively. Alternatively, the European Centre for Disease Prevention’s 
assessment considers the two forms of risk, the importing and the transmission of EVD, as a single over 
all risk, which provides a similar, but seemingly less definitive risk rating of low to very low.  The 
choice of which way to evaluate and present the two official risk assessments is not justified or clarified 
in either document; moreover, what constitutes low or very low risk (in either case) is not elucidated 
(beyond the notion of a “handful of cases of EVD over the coming months” – a vague statement in and 
of itself), leaving interpretation of this risk assessment up to the individual. These two reports, coming 
from similar organizations give an example of Spieglhalter, et. al.’s (2011) claim: “the attractive 
ambiguity of language becomes a failing when we wish to convey precise information, because words 
such as ‘doubtful,’ ‘probable,’ and ‘likely’ are inconsistently interpreted” (p. 1394). If the use of such 
language is not deemed advisable in communicating in general about risk, consideration needs to be 
given to how to otherwise communicate the information, and how to educate people to interpret such 
communications. 
Also related to language is the concern raised by some researchers (e.g., Martignon & Krauss, 
2009; Pratt, Ainley, Kent, Levinson, Yogui, & Kapadia, 2011; Till, 2014) over the deceptive (intentional 
or otherwise) use of relative (perceived) risk, rather than absolute risk, within communications. Relative 
risk, which is a comparative statement of the change in risk or a comparison of two different risks, can 
lead to grievous misunderstandings. Consider, for example, a dog food commercial that advertises that 
their new product has 50% more protein than that of their old product.  For many pet owners, a higher 
protein diet is desirable and the relative risk (positive, in this case) of 50% can easily be interpreted as a 
significant increase, but in fact, the absolute risk, or how significant the increase really is, depends upon 
how much protein was in the original product.  
In considering the communication of risk information, a final focus of research is of importance 
in this discussion: how individuals understand (or misunderstand) different representations of 
information related to risk. Till (2014) notes: “Findings of cognitive psychologists reveal evidence that 
the format of representation is crucial for understanding the real harm or chance of different options in 
situations of uncertainty … Frequency formats are much better processed by the human mind than 
ratios” (p. 84).   Till also argues that “Since risk-related data may be emotionally loaded, it is convenient 
to use representation formats that are objective, unbiased and easy to grasp for a wider public” (84); 
however, he also warns that “mathematical formats like ratios, fractions, percentages or decimals” can 
be misunderstood despite the visual or graphical representation used. Likewise, Spiegelhalter, et. al. 
(2011) discuss similar issues arising from the formatting and representational model of risk-related data 
and information. Clearly, the issue of how to represent risk information is a complex one, with further 
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research in how to clarify such representations both in terms of format and public awareness and 
understanding being needed. 
Theories Related to Risk: Analysis and Decision-Making 
Much discussion about risk analysis and decision-making starts with the emergence of the term 
‘economic man’ in the early 20th century. In the late 19th century, ‘economic man’ was a derogatory term 
used by those in opposition to John Stewart Mill’s assertion that in political economy, man seeks to gain 
as much as possible with the least effort or loss (Persky, 1995). Moving into the 1900s, ‘economic man’ 
became re-envisioned as describing man as a being aware of all possibilities and choices in a situation 
and therefore capable of making decisions that maximize his advantages, minimize his disadvantages, or 
both. The theory of the ‘economic man’ soon led to the development of the ‘subjective expected utility’ 
(SEU) model.  This model proposes that for any possible plan of action, there exists a set of hazards to 
which numerical values representing the impact of each particular hazard can be assigned. The product 
of the probability of a hazard occurring and the assigned value of impact for the hazard is defined as the 
risk of the hazard.  The risk of a plan is the sum of the risks of the hazards within the plan, and the plan 
with the lowest risk is the best decision to be made. By the 1940s, doubts about the ‘economic man’ and 
of the SEU model were well known: the complexities involved in any one risk-based decision-making 
task would prevent either theory being fully realized (Kent, Pratt, Levinson, Yogui, & Kapadia, 2010).  
In response, researchers (such as Kahneman, Simon, Slovic, and Tversky) proposed instead that man 
works within a ‘bounded rationality’, a reality in which not all is known, and even what is known need 
not always be considered. Simon (1959), shifted the focus from maximizing (minimizing) to satisfying 
(i.e., ‘economic’ man to ‘satisficing’ man), wherein acceptable or adequate choices are made based upon 
limited knowledge of the full reality of a situation. From that point, researchers (such as Kahneman, 
Slovic, and Tversky) undertook defining and investigating different heuristics and biases “which reduce 
the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgemental operations In 
general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” 
(Tversky, & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). The heuristics and biases proposed were seen as the 
mechanisms used by the ‘satisficing man’. As will become evident shortly, in many ways the reasoning 
behind the ‘economic man’ and the ‘satisficing man’ and the associated theories, can also be seen to 
play out within recent theories and perspectives on risk education, including where risk should be 
housed within curricula and how it should be approached pedagogically. 
Other Data and Modelling Concerns 
With all the different types and styles of risk assessments being made, guidelines are often 
determined to define “acceptable” risk, but as with the Ebola virus example above, what is to be 
considered within one establishment as acceptable risk is not likely to be consistent with another, even in 
the same field.  One need only to consider the current issues of water use, transportation of gas and oil, 
or fracking to realize that it is very possible that one person’s acceptable risk is another’s unacceptable 
risk. Throw “big data” into the mix, and the determination of risk becomes more complex. As 
Spiegelhalter (2104) states, “Big data means that we can get more precise answers… But this apparent 
precision will delude us if issues such as selection bias, regression to the mean, multiple testing, and 
overinterpretation of associations as causation are not properly taken into account… Serious statistical 
skill is required to avoid being misled” (p. 265). Tim Palmer, a physicist specializing in weather 
prediction and climate change, adds more uncertainness to the power of big data in risk assessment: 
“The truth is that the level of detail in the models isn’t really determined by scientific constraints… It is 
determined entirely by the size of the computers” (Macilwain, 2014, p. 1222).  Unlike Palmer’s concern 
about our ability to use big data meaningfully within technological constraints, Smith, an economist, 
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referring to climate change models based upon past mean-temperature changes over 1-10 years, argues: 
“The question is, when will we have significantly better quality information than we have today? I think 
we may have our answer from the climate before we get it from the physics’” (Macilwain, 2014, p. 
1223). Thus, questions about risk related to big data need to take into account more than the issues that 
Spiegelhalter (2014) noted: the capacity of computers and the ability for meaningful and relevant data to 
be collected for analysis must also be scrutinized. Meanwhile, risk assessments and management 
strategies are in constant demand for those seeking to make well-informed decisions. 
Current Curricular Inclusion of Risk and Risk-related Concepts 
Since risk impacts our lives in so many ways, it is not surprising that many educational systems 
and researchers are looking for ways to embed risk assessment and management and risk-based 
decision-making into the K-12 school system. Speaking about the UK, Pratt, Levinson, Kent, & Yogui 
(2011) comment: “In modern society, risk permeates decision-making at both personal and policy levels, 
a fact now being recognized in curricula” (p.1), including “Personal, Social, Health and Economic 
(PSHE) Education, Citizenship, Science and to a lesser extent in Mathematics” (Pratt & Yogui, 2010, p. 
1).  The word “risk” appears in at least one of the key stages for the above-mentioned curricula, except, 
that is, Mathematics (hence “to a lesser extent”), where ‘risk’ is not explicitly stated, but is implicitly 
connected to some of the content outlined.  
PSHE is different from the other courses mentioned because it is a non-statutory course.  Instead 
of a curriculum (or standards), PSHE has a guidance document that outlines the intent of the various key 
stages, which is meant to guide the development of school-based curricula for the courses. Within this 
guidance document, the following statement is made: “we expect schools to use their PSHE education 
program to equip pupils with a sound understanding of risk and with the knowledge and skills necessary 
to make safe and informed decisions” (Department of Education, Sept. 11, 2013).  Consequently, as a 
non-statutory course, the defining of risk and what knowledge and skills are necessary to make safe and 
informed decisions is left in the hands, for the most part, of individual schools.  
The remaining courses sited by Pratt and Yogui (2010) are statutory courses and thus have 
specific curricula (standards) for the different key stages or key stage pairings. For example, in 
Citizenship, at key stage 3, pupils are to be taught about “the functions and uses of money, the 
importance and practice of budgeting, and managing risk” (Department of Education, September, 2013, 
p. 2). This is a much narrower focus on the type of risk (specifically, financial) than given in PSHE, but 
as noted about the PSHE course, how such risks are to be determined or managed is not discussed. 
Similarly, in key stage 3 Science, pupils are to be taught attitudes towards working scientifically, 
including to “evaluate risks” (Department of Education, 2013, p. 4), yet there is no indication of what 
risk and its evaluation entails.  The same is true in key stage 4 Science, where it states that as part of 
their development of scientific thinking, “students should be taught so that they develop understanding 
and first hand experience of evaluating risks both in practical science and the wider societal context, 
including perception of risk” (Department of Education, 2014, p. 5).  It is likely that such notions are 
addressed in approved resources, raising the question, what should the resources include about these 
topics? 
As noted previously, risk, by name, is not mentioned in any of the key stages of the Mathematics 
curriculum within the National Curriculum in England. There is, of course, much content related to 
probability and statistics, which inherently would seem to connect itself to risk assessment and 
management as well as risk-based decision-making. This content, taught (as described in the document) 
through the pupils learning about working mathematically, such as selecting “appropriate concepts, 
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methods and techniques to apply to unfamiliar and ‘non-routine problems’ interpret their solution in the 
context of the given problem” (Department of Education, 2014, p. 6), could quite reasonably be 
interpreted as including risk-related learnings. 
A search of the Common Core State Standards Initiative (2015) finds two standards in which 
risk-related analyses and decision-making are the focus: CCS.Math.Content.HSS.MD.B.5 -- “Weigh the 
possible outcomes of a decision by assigning probabilities to payoff values and finding expected values” 
and CCS.Math.Content.HSS.MD.B.7 --“Analyze decisions and strategies using probability concepts 
(e.g., product testing, medical testing, pulling a hockey goalie at the end of a game)”. In both instances, 
the risk assessment being considered is grounded in probability and probabilistic reasoning. As only 
Mathematics and English Language Arts have Common Core State Standards, the concept of risk within 
other subject areas will vary according to the curricula or standards adopted in a particular state or 
region.  
As just one example of what is happening in the United States within the other subject areas, 
consider the Content Standards for California Public Schools (California State Board of Education, 
2014), which mentions risk in all but 7 of the documents posted on the site (specifically, English 
Language Arts, Building and Construction; Energy, Environment, and Utilities; Engineering and 
Architecture; Fashion and Interior Design; Manufacturing and Product Development; and World 
Languages).  In many cases, “risk” in the content standards is used in a discussion of at-risk students; 
however, specific references to risk assessment and management, as well as risk-based decision-making, 
are given.  For example, the Health Education Content Standards for California Public Schools, 
Kindergarten Through Grade Twelve (California Department of Education, 2009) document includes, in 
the rationale for Standard 4: Interpersonal Communication, the statement: “The ability to appropriately 
convey and receive information, beliefs, and emotions is a skill that enables students to manage risk, 
conflict, and differences and to promote health” (California Department of Education, 2009, p. viii) and 
Standard 7: Practicing Health-Enhancing Behaviors states: “All students will demonstrate the ability to 
practice behaviors that reduce risk and promote health” (p. viii).  Through all grades, the Health 
standards frequently reference students learning about ways to reduce particular risks and to avoid risky 
behaviors. Alternatively stated, the focus is mainly on identifying risk factors and options related to 
risky situations or the awareness of and management of risk.  In addition, decision-making related to risk 
is also considered (mainly from the perspective of reducing risk). Analysis of risk does not appear to be 
a primary focus; however, the focus on knowing about risks would be a primary step towards analysis of 
them. Within the Grades 9 – 12 by Disciplinary Core Ideas (Schweingruber, Keller, & Quinn, 2012) 
document for Grades 9-12 Science, learning related to ideas of risk considers the “limitations on the 
precision of data (e.g., number of trials, cost, risk, time), and refine the design accordingly” (p. 47). This 
statement harkens back to some of the concerns expressed by Spiegelhalter (2014), and Palmer and 
Smith (Macilwain, 2014) and it is likely that such a consideration would include an analysis of the risk 
involved in the identification and collection of data and decisions being made upon that analysis. 
Like the United States, Canada also does not have a single unified set of curricula; however, the 
four Western provinces, the three territories, and some of the Atlantic provinces are all using the 
Western and Northern Canadian Protocol (WNCP) Common Curriculum Frameworks for K-9 and 10-12 
Mathematics (CCF) as the foundation for their respective provincial and territorial mathematics 
curricula. For some of these jurisdictions, the curricula documents used are identical to the WNCP CCFs 
(save the cover page), while in other jurisdictions, the same mathematical content is presented in 
different ways in order to better communicate the specific initiatives and priorities of that jurisdiction. In 
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some (rare) cases, content is added or deleted from the WNCP CCFs at the jurisdictional level; however, 
the overall agreement between the different curriculum documents is still very high.  
Within the WNCP documents, risk is specifically mentioned in upfront matter, which gives a 
brief synopsis of the pedagogical and mathematical beliefs and processes that the document is grounded 
upon. These references to risk all relate to the importance of encouraging and supporting intellectual risk 
taking within mathematics: “Creating an environment where students openly look for, and engage in, 
finding a variety of strategies for solving problems empowers students to explore alternative and 
developed confident, cognitive mathematical risk-takers” (WNCP, 2008, p. 8). However, this is not to 
say that risk analysis and risk-based decision-making does not get consideration within the curricular 
documents.  Consider, for example, the first outcome in Grade 12 Workplace and Apprenticeship 
Mathematics (Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 2013b): “Analyze and interpret problems that 
involve probability”, and specifically, indicator 1.6 for this outcome: “Explain, using examples, how 
decisions may be based on a combination of theoretical probability calculations, experimental results 
and subjective judgments” (p. 26). It can be easily argued that such decisions may well, in fact likely 
would, be in relation to situations involving risk. A similar outcome, in the course Grade 12 Foundations 
of Mathematics (Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 2013a), “ Interpret and assess the validity of odds 
and probability statements” has the indicator “1.5 Explain, using examples, how decisions may be based 
on probability or odds and on subjective judgement” (p. 71), which is also easily connected to risk 
assessment and management, as well as risk-based decision-making. Thus, within these two courses, 
students should be engaging in risk analysis and risk-based decision-making through the consideration 
of both objective and subjective knowledge. It can be argued that these two indicators give a bit more 
direction towards what students might learn when reasoning about risk than what was found in 
previously discussed curricular documents, namely probability, odds, and subjective judgments in 
decision-making; however, where it is obvious what objective knowledge the students are to consider, 
i.e., probabilities and odds, what kinds of subjective knowledge to be considered (or if it is open-ended) 
remains undefined.  
Risk Education 
With the above insights into some of the more common ways that risk, risk analysis, risk 
management, and risk-based decision-making have been incorporated into a selection of (Western) 
curricular and standards documents, thoughts now turn to what is being said and researched about in 
relation to risk pedagogy. Until recently, when risk started to impact people’s daily lives in a myriad of 
ways, risk education, particularly at the K-12 levels, was generally not being considered, and thus, was 
not a focus of research either. In the field of risk education, links between existing theories and research 
on risk and decision-making in other domains are often forged along with considerations of new ideas 
and relationships. Within this paper, two particular aspects will be emphasized: the assumptions, beliefs, 
and theories supporting the approaches taken, and the approaches themselves. Given primary focus 
herein is the work of two sets of researchers: Krauss and Martignon; and Ainley, Kapdia, Kent, Levison, 
Pratt, and Yogui.  
Research by Krauss and Martignon. The research in risk education by Martignon and Krauss 
(2009) focused on developing within students a “chain of competencies that make up good decision 
making for informed consent in basic domains of modern life like those of medical and investment 
decisions” (p. 229). Further, recognizing that “while most of the mathematical training of secondary 
school tends to be soon forgotten by those who do not pursue a career requiring further mathematical 
tools, mathematical competencies acquired until the ninth or tenth year of age appear to remain robust 
and unaltered during subsequent life” (p. 228), grade four students were selected to be participants in the 
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study. In carrying out their study of the grade four students’ development of the particular competencies, 
Martignon and Krauss turned to research findings demonstrating that hands-on activities and tools can 
strengthen learning and sought ways to incorporate such strategies into their pedagogical design. 
Martignon and Krauss (2009) also provide an explanation of the major assumptions behind their 
intent of the study, and in particular, underlying the chain of competencies ultimately investigated: 
Stochastic literacy is a necessary condition for enlightened decision making in an information-
based society. Becoming conscious that judgments about our fellow human beings and about 
nature should often be based on probabilistic rather than strict logical implications can reduce 
the impact of prejudices and stereotypes. Moreover, an understanding of probabilities can 
shape our decisions allowing us to assess possible risks associated with our actions.  In fact, 
good modelling of risky situations can sustain our cognitive and emotional perspective on 
personal and collective affairs, reducing our anxieties and guiding our informed consent (p. 
227). 
A number of key ideas emerge from this statement, the first of which is the claim that enlightened 
decision-making is dependent upon a significant understanding of stochastics.  Second, the claim is 
made that probability-based reasoning can reduce the impact of prejudices and stereotypes.  A third 
assertion is that probabilistic knowledge can support risk assessment, and finally, that probabilistic 
modelling, done well, can mitigate the impact of otherwise held cognitive and emotional perspectives by 
moderating anxiety and providing support for strong decisions. In other words, probabilistic and 
statistical knowledge and reasoning are being centered as a (if not the) key player in risk education; 
moreover, such learnings can reduce (perhaps even eliminate) negative results of more affective 
responses, such as anxiety, prejudices and stereotypes. As such, the focus of the study is on the 
development of rational competencies and indirectly, the diminishing of the impact of affective 
reasoning. 
The series of competencies that this study investigated are intended to act as a “tool box for 
decision heuristics in the bounded rationality paradigm” (Martignon, & Krauss, 2009, p. 229) for 
students in the classroom and in their future lives.  Within this bounded rationality paradigm, Martignon 
and Krauss argue that, like the satisficing man, people “combine elements of basic Bayesian reasoning 
with effective decision heuristics” (p. 229) that they have selected to be of importance.  The purpose of 
the play-based activities in the study are thus to give the students the tools necessary to make rational 
appraisals and decisions that are both effective and efficient (within a bounded rationality paradigm).  
In the study, through the use of cards and tinker cubes, the teaching of the grade four students 
begins with the investigation of making logical inferences within the context of if-then statements. 
However, “Preparing children for decision-making practices requires training in making inferences, not 
just strictly logical but also, most importantly, probabilistic ones” (Martignon, & Krauss, 2009, p. 231), 
and so the students move next onto activities involving “conditional implications” (p. 232) as a 
consequence of the inclusion of conditional probabilities. From there, the students engage in activities 
that involve the comparing of proportions. The researchers explain: “[students] need to understand 
conditional probabilities for determining the validities of features and they need to make comparisons 
between different validities of features for establishing rankings among features… These competencies 
are at the core of risk assessment” (p. 231). Further, Martignon and Krauss explain: “The comparison of 
proportions is essential in comparing feature validities and for assessing risks” (p. 232).  The research, 
and the experimental teaching, for this study ends with the students playing a game in which comparing 
of risks can be used to determine which of a number of possible moves is the least risky. Overall, the 
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ordering of the activities is described as “a ‘historic trajectory’… from logic to probability” (p. 238), 
giving the students a historically accelerated experiential learning of decision-making and reasoning 
with risk.   
Research by Ainley, Kapdia, Kent, Levinson, Pratt, and Yogui. Foundational to their study of 
risk education, Kent, Pratt, Levinson, Yogui, and Kapadia, (2010) explain that: “Going beyond the idea 
of risk in statistical theory, we are trying to understand how personal values and models influence 
thinking about risk and the process of decision-making, and the implications of this for classroom 
practice” (p. 1). Thus, different from Martignon and Krauss (2009), this group of researchers considers 
the role of affective (emotional) knowledge and responses in decision-making and risk by making “An 
initial assumption ... that decision-making involves the coordination of different kinds of information, 
based on quantitative models and personal value systems and judgements” (p. 1). This study also differs 
from the one previously described in that it is focused on a different category of research participants: 
mathematics and science teachers with an extension to one group of high school students. The selection 
of mathematics and science teachers as participants is related to the previous discussion of risk within 
curricular (standards) documents, as well as a recognition that often the socio-scientific aspects of risk 
and decision making are seen as part of science education, while the stochastic aspects are seen as part 
of mathematics education. The participants were paired (one mathematics teacher with one science 
teacher) in the study to shed light on this assumption, but also to see the result of having both 
approaches working together as an attempt to inform where and how risk might best be brought into 
curricula in general. Overall, it was hoped that the participants would come to a better understanding of 
risk and decision-making processes and features through their involvement in the study; an 
understanding which might then be taken back into the respective teachers classrooms. A final part of 
the purpose of their study was to investigate how the results of the study aligned with existing research 
and theories about risk and decision-making. In particular, a focus was given to investigating the 
prevalence and strength of the application of the priority heuristic by the participant teachers (see Pratt, 
Levinson, et. al., 2011); however, in this paper the focus will remain on the reasoning behind the design 
of the decision-making software tool that was developed and implemented and on the choice of 
participants. 
 Reflecting upon the various theories and research of risk, Kent et. al. (2010) argue: “we think it 
is clear that students cannot be educated to think about risk only from a heuristic basis. There is a need 
for a systematic quantified analysis of some kind” (p. 2), which the team decides to attempt through the 
creation of a set of software tools entitled Deborah’s Dilemma. The first characteristic that should be 
identified about Deborah’s Dilemma is that the researchers attempted to create the tools to deal with a 
particular real-world (like) situation.  This decision is supported by the work of Gal (2012) who argues 
that, with respect to risk education, “The content of instructional tasks should not be limited to 
traditional examples taken from games of chance or based on artificial problems, but the kinds of 
everyday contexts where probability plays a role and where adults encounter uncertainty and risk” (p. 6).  
Deborah’s dilemma is she has been told by a doctor that she needs to have back surgery. The user of the 
software tools is provided contextual information regarding minor and major hazards related to the 
surgery, and aspects of Deborah’s life that are impacted by the health of her back. Based on this 
information, the participants are asked to recommend to Deborah whether or not she should go ahead 
with the surgery.  As is often the case in real life, the information provided is at times inconsistent and 
incomplete, as well as from a variety of sources. 
The software package developed has three tools for the user to engage with: the ‘Operation 
Outcomes’ tool, the ‘Painometer’ tool, and the ‘Risk Mapping’ tool.  The Operation Outcomes tool 
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allows the user to input various probabilities obtained from the information provided regarding the 
possible outcomes of having the surgery (successful to death, inclusively). The tool uses the 
probabilities entered by the user to run simulations of the surgery occurring. The user then requests the 
tool to carry out single or multiple runs (surgeries) and an outcome (or set of outcomes) is generated by 
the program.  Because the participants chose which hazards to consider in the use of this tool, their 
affective responses were necessarily part of their decision-making.  
The Painometer tool allows the teachers to “control Deborah’s level of pain tolerance, the 
amount of work and domestic/leisure/sport activity that Deborah does and the pain intensiveness of 
each, assuming that some types of work and sport would worsen the pain and others would relieve” 
(Pratt, Ainley, Kent, Levinson, Yogui, & Kapadia, 2011, p. 330).  In addition, the participants could add 
activities to the painometer to esplore “whether a balance could be achieved between pain-inducing and 
pain-relieving activities, so that Deborah might manage her pain within tolerable limits from day to day” 
(Pratt, Ainley, et. al., 2011, pp. 330-331).  Because the participants controlled the level of pain assigned 
to each activity (compared to a standardized tolerance level), the Painometer tool allowed additional 
aspects of their affective responses to be accounted for. 
An important confirmation for the researchers from an initial trial of the study, where only the 
Operation Outcomes and Painometer tools were used by the participants, was that the participants were 
struggling with bringing the two aspects influencing their decisions (the possible outcomes of the 
operation and the levels of pain associated with daily tasks without the operation) because their analyses 
were taking place in two disconnected tools.  As a result, the researchers implemented the ‘Risk 
Mapping’ tool – a graphical modeling tool of decision boxes and hazard boxes. Colour coding of the 
boxes allowed the participants to represent the level of risk associated with the various decisions and 
hazards (as opposed to numerical probabilities). The researchers explain: “Whilst the mapping tool does 
enforce the association of impact and likelihood with each hazard, we did not enforce any model for 
how these relate to ‘level of risk’.  It was exactly at this point where we hoped users would express their 
personal models for the situation, providing us with a window on their thinking about risk” (Kent, et. al., 
2010, p. 4), once again assuring the possibility for both rational and affective reasoning to emerge. With 
this third tool, the participants were found to be able to better coordinate their thinking about the hazards 
and their thinking about the impacts. 
With this brief overview of pertinent literature and research related to risk, risk analysis, risk 
management and risk-based decision-making, the stage is now set for the introduction of the theoretical 
framework for this paper. As mentioned previously, this theoretical framework is based upon two 
distinct worldviews, an Indigenous worldview and the Traditional Western worldview, and analysis 
occurs within an ethical space. The introduction to the theoretical framework begins with a discussion of 
broad understandings and considerations necessary when working within a worldview framework. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
To carry out a theoretical analysis of risk education from the perspective of the two 
aforementioned worldviews, it is important to acknowledge the definition of worldview being used in 
this paper and to clarify with whom each of the worldviews are associated.  Worldview is a term that has 
been defined in many ways, depending upon the context and resulting purposes in which it is to be used. 
For example, when considering worldviews within the context of different religions, one might define 
alternate religious worldviews according to answers and approaches to the big questions of life (e.g., 
what is the purpose of life, where did life come from) and how and where the answers to those questions 
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can be sought or found. Regardless of the context (religious, economic, political…) however, all 
worldview descriptions ultimately consider (and answer) two questions: “what kinds of knowledge are 
of value” and “what ways of knowing are valued”. It is this less context dependent and more holistic 
way of defining individual worldviews that is used in this article. 
Equally important to understand about the worldviews and their descriptions is that the particular 
names of the worldviews should not be thought to mandate inclusion or exclusion of any individual from 
said worldviews on the basis that he/she is or is not considered a(n) ‘Western’ or ‘Indigenous’ person. 
The names of these two worldviews comes from observed commonalities within the named group in 
general, but it is not to be concluded that an individual holds said worldview solely on the basis of their 
membership in the larger group (e.g., a person who identifies as being of ‘Western’ heritage need not be 
grounded within the Traditional Western worldview). Conversely, holding a particular worldview is not 
restricted by what group one is a member of (e.g., a person identifying as ‘Indigenous’ may hold the 
Traditional Western, or any other worldview). 
Some concern may also arise over the use of different articles (‘the’ and ‘an’) proceeding the two 
worldview names (‘the’ Traditional Western worldview and ‘an’ Indigenous worldview); however, this 
is done with purpose. As will become evident shortly, the Traditional Western worldview is one in 
which little (or no) variation is possible because of the emphasis on singularity of truth, knowledge, and 
ways of knowing. As a result, it is distinguishable from other possible Western worldviews. Hence, ‘the’ 
Traditional Western worldview is ‘a’ Western worldview – one of many possibilities. ‘An’ Indigenous 
worldview, as again will become evident shortly, does not preclude variability within the worldview. An 
Indigenous worldview, as presented, is not representative of any one particular Indigenous group’s 
worldview. Rather, it is an overarching worldview comprised of commonalities amongst the ways of 
knowing and kinds of knowledge valued by different Indigenous groups and peoples around the globe.  
This worldview has within it the flexibility to fit the variance of specific worldviews found amongst 
Indigenous groups and peoples, thus it is really one of a range of Indigenous worldviews, hence ‘an’. 
With these broad understandings and considerations in hand, brief introductions to the Traditional 
Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview, as understood for the theoretical framework for this 
paper, will now be provided. 
The Traditional Western worldview 
The Traditional Western worldview has its own “ontological, epistemological, sociological, and 
ideological ways of thinking and being” (Kovach, 2009, p. 21) that can be distinguished from those of 
other worldviews, such as an Indigenous worldview. The Traditional Western worldview has as its 
foundation at least five defining characteristics, which, in a rational way, confirm and strengthen each 
other (Absolon and Willett, 2005; Kovach, 2009; Ermine, 2007; Little Bear, 2000; Meyer, 2003; 
Schelbert, 2003). Perhaps most important to the Traditional Western worldview is the belief that 
knowledge of value is “linear and singular, static, and objective” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 82) in nature, 
resulting in the valuing of one correct answer to any problem or question; further, this answer cannot be 
proven false or replaced by alternative answers. In effect, this characteristic of the Traditional Western 
worldview places an emphasis upon the defining of dichotomous relationships. In addition, the 
Traditional Western worldview holds that there is one correct way to achieve these answers (at least 
within each category of context considered). The valuing of the linearity of knowledge naturally gives 
rise to the defining and perceiving of hierarchies of knowledge, giving rise to specialization and 
superiority and authority of both knowledge and knower. Seeking of more knowledge, then, is a way to 
become more specialized, more superior, and more authoritative. Within the traditional worldview, new 
knowledge is sought for the sake of the knowledge itself. These hierarchies, based upon linearity, help to 
Russell 
eliminate the possibility of alternative answers or solution strategies – as one moves up a knowledge 
ladder, the newest knowledge level is given authority over all previous levels. The Traditional Western 
worldview holds rational thought and the scientific method as crucial in the obtaining knew knowledge, 
or stated more explicitly, knowledge of value comes from observation that is done in total isolation of all 
other factors and is based upon measurable data. The result is that the notion of truth being linked to 
measurability, and knowledge of value being related to physical objects and processes that are external 
to the individual and that are in isolation of other intruding influences. Directly related to the scientific 
method and rational thinking are the notions of the compartmentalization and categorization of 
knowledge into small components which are also important within the Traditional Western worldview. 
Through compartmentalization and categorization, knowledge is believed to not only be emerging in an 
isolated way (not interfered with by extraneous factors), but it is also easier to accurately measure.  
Together, these processes confirm not only validity, but absolute truth; further, that absolute truth is 
known by experts who are attributed with absolute authority. Another consequence of the rationality, 
measurability, compartmentalization, and categorization of knowledge of value is that it is also abstract 
knowledge – void of context and dissected into small parcels of truth. Finally, as a consequence of the 
truth of the valued knowledge never changing, the Traditional Western worldview values the 
preservation of this knowledge in written, an abstract (symbolic) and permanent form in which the truth 
is captured for perpetuity.  
An Indigenous Worldview  
In an Indigenous worldview there are number of defining characteristics, all explicitly and 
implicitly linked to one main characteristic: relationships (Absolon 2010, Barnhart & Kawagly, 2005; 
Canadian Council on Learning, 2007; Ermine, 1995; Hogan, 2000; Kovach, 2009; Leavitt, 1995; Little 
Bear, 2000; Meyer, 2003; Youngblood Henderson, 2000). The main encompassing characteristic of this 
worldview, the establishment and maintenance of relationships with all of creation (including people, the 
earth, the spirit world, and the cosmos), is foundational to all knowledge of value and ways of knowing. 
It is through the establishment and maintaining of relationships that knowledge worth knowing emerges. 
As a result, knowledge of value in an Indigenous worldview also contributes towards the perpetuation 
and strengthening of relationships. Moreover, the relationships that are gained and maintained in the 
seeking of knowledge come from all ways in which a relationship can exist: physical, emotional, 
spiritual, and intellectual. In an Indigenous worldview it is important that knowledge is intrinsically and 
extrinsically connected to the place from which it came – the knowledge is in relationship to place. 
Knowledge that only exists in abstraction where it is decontextualized and disassembled into its 
constituent parts no longer carries with it the connection to the relationship(s) for which and through 
which it was created and, as a consequence, such knowledge becomes less valuable. In addition, since 
knowledge is created and shared through relationships that are not just intellectual in nature (but also 
emotional, physical, and spiritual), the restriction that knowledge of value comes from objective sources 
and rational processes is not found within an Indigenous worldview, rather subjective knowledge is 
often viewed as just as valuable, or even more valuable, than objective knowledge. Personal experience 
and intuition (from the past, present, and future) are also considered valid sources of knowledge. 
Moreover, within an Indigenous worldview, valuable knowledge is understood to be different for 
different people, and the diverse ways in which these different knowledges can be created are also of 
value. This appreciation for diversity in knowledge and ways of knowing also derives from the 
importance of relationships, where getting to know and appreciate the uniqueness of who or what one is 
in a relationship with is crucial for the relationship to be authentic, meaningful, and productive. It is as a 
result of this characteristic of an Indigenous worldview that the knowledge that is created and valued is 
able to remove the sense of dichotomy between what might otherwise seem to be diametrically opposed 
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ideas, such as good and evil. Instead of being polar opposites, the two states become two parts of the 
totality of being. This means that within the Indigenous worldview, alternate answers and alternate 
solutions (and strategies) to a problem are not only recognized, but valued for the wisdom that they 
bring to relationships. As a significant part of any relationship is seen to be the act of giving back, 
sharing is also an important part of an Indigenous worldview, as is the use of the knowledge gained 
through relationships to strengthen those relationships and create new ones. Knowledge is not sought for 
the sake of knowledge, but for the sake of how it can contribute to the wellbeing of the whole (including 
self, family, community, the earth, the universe and the cosmos). Since knowledge varies as 
relationships change and emerge, knowledge of value is most often kept and shared through oral 
traditions, allowing the sharer of the knowledge the flexibility to adjust the knowledge for the 
relationships into which it is being brought; sharing of knowledge and giving back through knowledge is 
therefore sensitive to relationships, keeping relationship central to the valuing of knowledge. This oral 
tradition and the knowledge contained therein contribute to the traditional (cultural) knowledge of the 
Indigenous people and the place and story in which the knowledge originated is considered part (the 
story) of the knowledge.  Without place, and thus story, the knowledge has no value. 
The Meeting of the Two Worldviews: Ethical Spaces  
Much tension can (and historically, has) easily formed between the two worldviews described. 
For this reason, the analysis that follows will be considered from within an ethical space, that is, the 
space that exists between two different knowledge systems. Ermine (2007) explains that such a space “is 
initially conceptualized by the unwavering construction of difference and diversity between human 
communities” (p. 194), just as the descriptions of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview has. By considering these differences – which define the uniqueness of each worldview 
resulting from “distinct history, knowledge tradition, philosophy, and social and political reality” (p. 
194) – and then contrasting the worldviews in a non-judgmental way that creates and allows for 
engagement in the ethical space between the two cultures. Therefore, analysis using the theoretical 
framework of the two worldviews carried out within an ethical space is not meant to evaluate or rank the 
two worldviews; rather, it is an opportunity to better understand what is currently under consideration in 
research pertaining to risk education and to hypothesize where else the research might head.  
In order to engage in such an ethical space, Ermine (2007) holds two criteria must be met: the 
context under consideration must be unethical, and there needs to be cross-cultural concerns. With 
respect to ethical spaces, Ermine defines ethics as “the capacity to know what harms or enhances the 
well-being of sentient creatures” (p. 195), so an unethical issue would be one that has caused, or has the 
real potential to cause harm, to which it is contended in this paper, that risk education is focused on the 
potential for harm, and that risk education has the potential to influence (positively, negatively, or not at 
all), students’ ability to negotiate situations and events involving risk. Therefore, risk education can be 
considered an unethical issue. 
The second criteria of the meaningful entrance into an ethical space is that there needs to be 
cross-cultural concerns related to the issue of interest. Of course, risk is a topic or issue, which knows no 
cultural bounds in the broadest connotations; however, feminist theory, critical race theory, theories of 
decolonization, and other post-modern and post-structural theories acknowledge a multitude of cross-
cultural concerns that relate to risks and disparities in risk with respect to culture. For example, currently 
in Canada, the risk-based cross-cultural concern of missing and murdered Indigenous women (see 
Kappo, 2014 for a brief overview of the cultural nature of this issue) is a prominent issue of interest for 
many.  
Russell 
With an understanding of the two worldviews and of an ethical space in which they can be used 
to analyze risk education, the stage is set to consider what aspects of the research of risk education align 
with aspects of either of the worldviews. Further, consideration can also be given to those aspects of 
either worldview which, so far, have not entered into the investigation of and theorizing about risk 
education.  These ideas can then be removed from the ethical space to see if they might be meaningful 
and plausible within risk education itself.   
 
Analysis 
The theoretical framework of the two worldviews (the Traditional Western and an Indigenous) is 
now brought to bare, within an ethical space, upon the aspects of risk and risk education discussed in the 
literature synopsis above. It cannot be overstated that the purpose of this analysis is not to judge what 
has been done within existing research, but to present a new way of thinking about that research in light 
of the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that are being promoted or highlighted, and thus valued. 
Likewise, it provides an opportunity to identify other possible kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing 
that have been either overlooked, ignored, or denied.  Neither of these analyses is a judgment on choices 
made or not made, but rather a framing of what is and what else might be possible or considered. The 
analysis begins by considering what ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge are already being valued, 
both implicitly and explicitly, within the existing research, then turns to what is not present.  
Valued Knowledge and Ways of Knowing In Communications and Risk Research and Theories 
Both the topics of communicating about risk, and theories of risk analysis and decision-making 
are inconclusive regarding how or if they align with aspects of either of the two worldviews in relation 
to the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing being valued. In many communications about risk, the 
kind of knowledge and ways of knowing that are considered of value are not typically presented, only 
the conclusions made as a result of the particular positioning. For example, the two EVD risk assessment 
communications do not indicate what information the risk assessments are based upon, nor is the way in 
which that knowledge is known described. Assumptions, based upon past experiences and possibly even 
gut feelings, might cause one to lean towards a particular conclusion (e.g., this is rational knowledge 
based on scientific methods), but in reality only in-depth research of each particular circumstance could 
say for sure. The use of adjectives in risk communications is equally disagreeable towards the 
undertaken analysis. Although one might be positive that the risk that is being communicated about is 
based upon scientifically backed rational thinking, along with the hierarchical and compartmentalizing 
nature (e.g., very low, low, moderate, and so on) of their use (thereby aligning with the Traditional 
Western worldview); the subjective possibilities for interpretation of the terms would seem to lean more 
towards the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that are valued within an Indigenous worldview. 
Likewise, the mathematically theoretical nature of the SEU model would seem to indicate that linear, 
static, authoritative, and objective knowledge and ways of knowing are being emphasized, yet it also 
inherently must involve subjective reasoning related to what features of the risk are or are not considered 
(or identified). It is within the more applied aspects of the literature synopsis (i.e., risk in 
curricular/standards documents and risk education) that the theoretical analysis proposed above takes on 
more relevance and less ambiguity.   
Valued Knowledge and Ways of Knowing In Curricular (Standards) Documents 
Like above, in some of the examples provided regarding inclusion of risk and decision-making 
within curricular (standards) documents, the ways of knowing and the kind of knowledge being valued 
TME, vol. 12, no. 1,2&3, p. 76 
are not always evident; however, in some there are more easily identifiable indications.  For example, 
the UK’s Citizenship document, managing risk is tied to very factual and procedural ideas: functions and 
uses of money and budgeting. It would seem then, that likewise it would be expected that the way 
students should know about managing risk would also be in a routine-oriented, hierarchical and rational-
based way. Consequently, the emphasis would also appear to be on knowing of facts and procedures.  
Thus, both the ways of knowing and the kinds of knowledge valued by this inclusion of risk within 
Citizenship could be said to align closely with the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing valued 
within the Traditional Western worldview. Similarly, within California’s standards document for health 
education, there are also (likely) indications of valuing rational and scientific knowledge and ways of 
knowing, such as in the practicing of risk-reducing behaviours.  In so saying, the assumption is that the 
preferred risk-reducing behaviours would be presented to the students as rational and factual knowledge 
by an authority figure (the teacher), all of which is in direct alignment with the valuing of the Traditional 
Western worldview. However, the rational for Standard 4 document what is valued shifts from strictly 
static and objective knowledge to knowledge that includes beliefs and emotions which are of value 
within an Indigenous worldview. Moreover, by including beliefs and emotions, not only is what kinds of 
knowledge valued expanded – so too are the possible ways of knowing expanded to include emotional 
ways of knowing and possibly others (such as spiritual, physical, intuitional, or experiential).  The two 
examples from mathematics curricula from Saskatchewan add another twist to the analysis since despite 
the absence of the word risk within the indicators or outcomes, it is reasonable to assume that risk would 
be a consideration within the decision-making, if only on the basis that the decision-making is within the 
context of probability education. In these two examples, both objective and subjective forms of 
knowledge are to be considered.  In the Workplace and Apprenticeship Mathematics course it is made 
clear that the objective knowledge might originate from theoretical calculations or from experiments, 
while in the Foundations of Mathematics course no such clarification is made. With respect to the kinds 
of objective knowledge and subjective knowledge that are to be considered, neither course offers further 
clarification. Thus, it can be contended that these two examples of outcome indicators are specifying that 
both rational and scientific knowledge and ways of knowing as well as subjective knowledge and ways 
of knowing are to be considered within decision-making, and thus valued. Consequently, the ways of 
knowing and kinds of knowledge valued aligns with the Traditional Western worldview and at least 
some of an Indigenous worldview.   
Valued Knowledge and Ways of Knowing in Risk Education – Martignon and Krauss 
The discussion of risk education, because of greater breadth and depth of information available, 
will allow for the most comprehensive analysis of the valuing of kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing. For example, consider the stated assumptions for Martignon and Krauss’ (2009) study. First, 
“Stochastic literacy is a necessary condition for enlightened decision making” (p. 227) is a statement 
demonstrating the valuing rational knowledge and ways of knowing. Likewise, the implication of stating 
that probabilistic reasoning can impact prejudices and stereotypes is also conveying a strong message 
about the importance of rational knowledge and ways of knowing over prejudices and stereotypes, 
which are often argued to be the products of emotional rather than rational knowledge. Of course, the 
reverse argument can be made that many prejudices and stereotypes are proposed and defended through 
what, at least on the surface, appears to be rational and scientific evidence. Finally, as informed consent 
is being couched within good modeling (undoubtedly based upon probabilities) the implication would be 
that such informed consent also comes from rational and scientifically produced knowledge. Thus, the 
kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing supported by the assumptions of Martignon and Krauss’ 
(2009) would best align with those of the Traditional Western worldview. 
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Considering the design of Martignon and Krauss’ (2009) study there are a number of ways in 
which the valued knowledge and ways of knowing can be directly related to those of the Traditional 
Western worldview, starting with the ordering of the activities. First, the order is described as the series 
of competencies rather than a series of competencies. There is an assumed correctness to the order in 
this choice of article (whether consciously intended or not), a hierarchy of learning through which one 
must progress in order to achieve the intended goal of giving the students a toolbox of decision 
heuristics. This assumption of a correctness of order is further confirmed in the explanation that the 
design is following the “’historic trajectory … from logic to probability” (p. 238). The strictness of 
defining and the authority of following the series of competencies given are representative of the valuing 
of rational and scientific knowledge and ways of knowing, with no consideration made of alternative 
kinds of knowledge or ways of knowing. The design of the activities also is grounded in rational and 
scientific knowledges and ways of knowing. For example, derivation of specific heuristics implies that 
these heuristics are most important, or singularly best, for considering risk and decision-making. These 
are not just any heuristics; however, they are heuristics that are bounded in rationality. In fact, rationality 
and scientific methods dominate this study’s intended learnings, with categorizations of the kinds of 
activities with very specific and singular connections being made between them. Overall, Martignon and 
Krauss’ study is well grounded within the kinds of knowledges and ways of knowing valued within the 
Traditional Western worldview, and in some ways, it supports the devaluation of other ways of knowing 
and kinds of knowledge, such as beliefs and emotional knowledge.  
Valued Knowledge and Ways of Knowing in Risk Education – Ainley, Kapdia, Kent, Levinson, 
Pratt, and Yogui. 
As noted earlier, the primary difference between the study done by Ainley, Kapdia, Kent, 
Levinson, Pratt, and Yogui and the study done by Martignon and Krauss is the former’s 
acknowledgement and incorporation of affective or emotional responses and data. As such, in the areas 
of overlap, it will be assumed that the research of Kapadia, et. al. also values the ways of knowing and 
kinds of knowledge that are foundational to the Traditional Western worldview. Other kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing, however, can also be seen as valued within this research. First, the 
assumption held by the researchers regarding the importance of personal value systems and judgments 
(as noted by Kent et. al., 2010) while making decisions aligns with the valuing of emotional and 
possibly experiential knowledge and ways of knowing, which are valued within an Indigenous 
worldview. This assumption is further realized within the study proper through both the Painometer and 
Risk Mapping tools. The Painometer is explicitly about incorporating the emotional responses and 
knowledge of the participants into the study, and the Risk Mapping tool is an attempt to create a model 
detailing relationships between emotional responses and knowledge together with the rational and 
scientific knowledge captured within the Operation Outcomes.  Even the specific design of the 
Operation Outcomes tool allows for emotional responses and knowledge to (implicitly) enter into the 
decision-making experience as the participants choose which outcomes to focus on while using the tool.  
One can easily assume that some, if not all, of these choices are subjectively determined based upon 
emotional and relationship-based knowledge.  This emphasis on emotional and relationship-based 
knowledge and ways of knowing is representative of some of the kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing valued within an Indigenous worldview.  Additionally, relationship-based knowledge and ways 
of knowing are also being encouraged by the design of the study, stepping beyond the typical boundaries 
(or compartments) of science and mathematics, inviting the mathematics teachers to consider the socio-
scientific aspects of risk in the given dilemma, while encouraging the science teachers to consider the 
mathematical properties of probability at the same time. Finally, because the design of the study is such 
that no one kind of knowledge or way of knowing is overtly presumed to be of greater importance, the 
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valuing of rational and scientific knowledge within the study can also be seen to align with an 
Indigenous worldview’s consideration and acceptance of diverse ways of knowing and diverse 
knowledge depending upon the relationships sought and created within that context and at that time.  
Unrecognized or Devalued Kinds of Knowledge and Ways of Knowing  
As was stated previously, but warrants revisiting, when working within an ethical space, the 
above analyses and the ones to follow are not intended to serve as statements of judgments; rather, they 
are meant to give a different perspective, a new set of lenses through which risk, decision-making, and 
risk education can be contemplated and explored. For the same reasons as no identification of what 
kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are being valued within different forms of communications 
about risk or within theories of risk and decision-making, the same two portions of the literature review 
will not be analyzed. Instead, the reader is invited to, at their leisure, reflect upon the possibilities from 
within their own knowledge and ethical spaces and experiences. 
In reflecting upon the positioning of risk within curricular (standards) documents, the 
compartmentalization of risk into specific subjects is consistently present. As a result, the message 
(intended or not) conveyed is that risk, as mentioned in a particular place in a particular document, 
should be studied within the isolated conditions therein. As such, the possibility of building relationships 
within the learning is bounded to particular kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing. What is not being 
explicitly recognized (hence valued) is the many ways in which risk crosses the artificial boundaries of 
subject areas within everyday life. Situations of risk that one encounters in their personal life rarely are 
restricted to one field only. Financial risk is not just risky in relation to money, but to every aspect of 
life,  just as what is involved in a health risk is never only medical in nature. Thus, there is an 
opportunity to investigate the possibility of risk education without specific subject boundaries.  To an 
extent, Ainley et. al.’s study has done so, but the possibilities of relationship-based knowledge can 
extend further. Perhaps risk and decision-making could be considered as guiding principles behind 
education, as competencies, which are common to, and integrative of, all subject areas; risk literacy 
could be seen as foundational across all curricula 
There are also other kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that have yet to be valued (or 
acknowledged, even if to be dismissed) within risk education research including intuitional, spiritual, 
physical, experiential, traditional, and cultural knowledge. There is an opportunity for reflection upon, 
and possible inclusion of one or more of these kinds of knowledge and their associated ways of knowing 
within risk education, and such possibilities deserve candid consideration. Next, a small hint of what 
such considerations might include is given. 
 
Why Consider the Unconsidered? 
Some might dismiss, at this point, everything that has proceeded in this paper as over-exuberant 
and self-indulgent theorizing.  Without any hint at why one might even consider any of the additional 
knowledges and ways of knowing mentioned, the whole idea can seem irrelevant and impossible to 
realize. For this reason, two real-life situations steeped in risk and decision-making are presented and 
reflected upon: the destructive tsunami of 2004, and the so-called “Navajo plague” of 1993. Each of 
these events took many lives, but each also reveals how some knowledges and ways of knowing that 
were ignored at the time may have changed the final outcomes. 
 
 
Russell 
Boxing Day, 2004 
On Dec. 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake centered near the west coast of Sumatra and under 
the Indian Ocean occurred. The energy released by this earthquake has been estimated to be equivalent 
to 23 000 atomic equal to those of Hiroshima.  The resulting tsunami a few hours later had waves that 
moved at the speed of a jet.  (National Geographic News, January 5, 2005). Pictures and videos of 
homes, people, animals, and all kinds of belongings being swept into the ocean went viral across all 
forms of media. More than 150 000 people were killed, with some estimates being placed at 250 000 and 
higher, and millions lost everything they had. Despite all of the technology and scientific models 
available to predict and communicate risks of earthquakes and tsunamis, scientists were unable to 
provide adequate warning for the event. Yet, a number of indigenous groups, frequently ignored or seen 
as inferior to other non-indigenous inhabitants, survived en masse. Unfortunately, the same was not true 
for the non-Indigenous people inhabiting the same islands and communities. The mass survival of these 
indigenous peoples is now recognized to be the result of their “in-depth knowledge of the environment” 
(Mercer, Dominey-Howes, Kelman, & Lloyd, 2007, p. 251). As an example, the Moken (or sea gypsies), 
an Indigenous group from Thailand who live on the Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar, “managed 
to anticipate the tsunami danger. Their knowledge of wind, tides, and the animals, which had been 
passed down from generation to generation, prepared them to deal with the natural disaster” (Perez, n. 
d., p. 1). Part of this knowledge included the silence of the cicadas, which was understood to tell the 
people to run for higher ground, and they did. When interviewers asked a Moken man why the tsunami 
had happened, he responded “The big wave had not eaten anyone for a long time, and it wanted to taste 
them again” (p. 2). Such knowledge would not, at least in Traditional Western worldview terms, be 
considered rational or scientific knowledge.  Nor is it emotional knowledge.  It is the traditional 
knowledge of the people, the knowledge which has been preserved and carried forward through 
generations of oral traditions. It is spiritual knowledge, intuitional knowledge, physical knowledge, and 
possibly experiential knowledge. No testing, isolation, compartmentalization, or abstraction of the 
knowledge was done. Similar examples from onslaught of the tsunami can be found throughout the 
region’s Indigenous peoples, including those who live on Nias Island where, not only did the Indigenous 
people survive, but so too did their homes that were nearly 100 years old, while the new modern homes 
on the island were destroyed. These examples are filled with a kind of knowledge and a way of knowing 
that has been “increasingly recognized in the international arena, yet is frequently overlooked in 
practice” (Mercer, et. al., 2007, p. 247).  Will the same be true in risk education? 
The Navajo Plague 
In the spring of 1993, a healthy, newly engaged, Navajo woman of 24 became sick one day with 
“a stuffy nose, a dry cough, aches, and little else. It looked like an ordinary case of the flu” (Arviso, & 
Cohen, 1999, p. 117). The following day, the woman “showed up in Crownpoint in severe respiratory 
distress and hypoxic ... She’d died a few hours later” (p. 118). On the day of her funeral, her 19 year old 
fiancé became similarly ill, was “brought to the GIMC emergency room in full respiratory and cardiac 
arrest and died shortly thereafter” (p. 120).  These were the two patients of a soon to be epidemic that 
was spreading through the Four Corners – the name given to a region within Arizona, New Mexico, 
Colorado, and Utah in which a number of Navajo reservations are located. Although the as yet 
unidentified disease was seemingly targeting only Navajo people (hence the name ‘Navajo Plague’), 
restaurants and businesses in communities adjoining the reservations began refusing to serve anyone 
who appeared to be Navajo in descent; people began cancelling vacation reservations in the south; and 
“the national media jumped to the conclusion that it was because they were Navajo that these individuals 
had contracted” (pp. 121-122) this acute respiratory distress syndrome. Local doctors and health care 
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workers were dumbfounded as to the underlying cause for the disease, and so the Centre for Disease 
Control (CDC) was called in to solve the mystery.  The CDC carried out a series of laboratory tests that 
“failed to identify any of the deaths as caused by a known disease such as bubonic plague”  (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). As additional testing continued, physicians and researchers 
repeatedly found that “The particular mixture of symptoms and clinical findings pointed… away from 
possible causes, such as exposure to a herbicide or a new type of influenza, and toward some type of 
virus”. Tissue samples were analyzed by virologists at the CDC, ultimately leading to the identification 
of a previously undocumented type of hantavirus. The species of mouse (the deer mouse) known to carry 
and transmit this virus through its fecal matter and urine is not considered endemic to the Four Corners 
environment, and for this reason, hantavirus had not been considered in the original testing. Had 
hantavirus been included within the possible underlying diseases that were originally tested for, many 
people may not have died.  
However, at least one of the healers within the Navajo reservations knew that a change in climate 
could result in the deer mouse being, at least temporarily, endemic to the Four Corners. In fact, a worker 
from the CDC, who was of Navajo decent had gone, to see the healer to ask about the disease.  The 
healer replied by showing the CDC worker a photograph of a sand painting with a mouse in it, and he 
also told the worker that “many years ago such a sickness had occurred and that the sand painting had 
been used to treat it” (Arviso, & Cohen, 1999, p. 122). In reality, the sand painting did more than 
identify the particular breed of mouse responsible for the illness. It also explained why the population 
size of that particular kind of mouse would increase: three or more years of excessive rain leads to 
increased production of the seeds of the dwarf pine trees in the area, and those seeds are one of the best 
food sources for the deer mouse. When finishing his sharing of the story of the sand painting, the healer 
told the worker to share this knowledge with the CDC, and more specifically, to “‘Look to the mouse’” 
(p. 122). Sadly, in all of the documented knowledge about this outbreak, there is no mention of anyone 
else (not even the Navajos living on the reservations) approaching the healer for information. Like the 
scientists, most Navajo people believed that this outbreak must be something new, beyond and foreign to 
their traditional knowledge. The CDC has officially acknowledged that: “Navajo Indians… recognize a 
similar disease in their medical traditions, and actually associate its occurrence with mice.  As strikingly, 
Navajo medical beliefs concur with public health recommendations for preventing the disease” (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). Perhaps, if the traditional knowledge and ways of knowing 
had been valued by the scientific practitioners and, dishearteningly, by the Navajo people themselves, 
the hantavirus diagnosis would have occurred sooner, and fewer young and promising lives would have 
been lost. Perhaps research into risk education would benefit from acknowledging the value of asking 
and listening to learn from traditional knowledge keepers. 
In both the case of the 2004 tsunami and the 1993 hantavirus epidemic, the traditional 
knowledges of indigenous peoples, neither based in rational scientific knowledge and ways of knowing 
or in emotional and affective knowledge and ways of knowing, could have reduced the risk to the people 
in those situations. However, to acknolwedge and value such knowledge and ways of knowing, and to 
incorporate them into our understanding of risk, risk understanding, risk management, and risk-based 
decision-making, we need to come to terms with the limitations imposed by beliefs such as significant 
stochastic understanding being necessary for decision-making. Undoubtedly, there are times when such 
stochastic knowledge is of huge benefit in decision-making, but as the two previous examples 
demonstrate, stochastic knowledge (at least as understood within Western knowledge and mathematics) 
is not the only way in which one can make enlightened decisions.  How this understanding will inform 
risk education remains to be seen. 
Russell 
Final Words 
At this point, the relevance of including the discussion of research on communicating about risk 
and theories of risk and decision-making within the review of the literature can be elucidated. 
Specifically, the consideration of alternative kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing could also be 
considered within the areas of communicating about risk and theorizing about risk and decision-making. 
It is a discussion which might not only result in significant consequences to the research being done, but 
it also could help in the processes of decolonizing stereotypical and prejudicial ideas held about 
Indigenous peoples and their knowledge as well as the resulting oppression and marginalization. 
Most of the research related to risk education and decision-making has been, for the most part, 
unaware (or possibly dismissive) of many of the ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge valued within 
an Indigenous worldview. Perhaps this is due to the Traditional Western worldview’s (which arguably 
has grounded much of academic research) unquestioning belief in absolute truth and rationality; perhaps 
it is due to the need to create the ‘other’ to find self-worth (another consequence of the underpinnings of 
the Traditional Western worldview and processes of colonization and oppression); or, perhaps it is due 
to the failure of an education system and its supporting research to include considerations of alternative 
ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge. The reason why is not of greatest importance; rather what is 
important is what will be done about this realization. 
The emerging field of risk education has within its reach an opportunity that has been missed or 
ignored by so many other fields of study: the valuing of alternative ways of knowing and kinds of 
knowledge beyond those that are rationally and scientifically-based and the emerging valuing of 
emotions and emotional responses. Perhaps this time, it will not be that “western science remains firmly 
entrenched in its traditional methods. An entrenchment from colonial times… when our ignorance of the 
‘other’ contributed to an increased divide between them (the developing world) and us (the Western 
world)” (Mercer, et. al, 2007, p. 246). Perhaps risk education will help break through these, often 
unspoken, boundaries. 
As a final note, if the decision is made to embark upon the consideration and possible inclusion 
of other kinds of knowledges and ways of knowing, care must be taken to not appropriate and 
commodify those kinds of knowledges and ways of knowing (Smith, 2000). In the valuing of new kinds 
of knowledges and ways of knowing, then so to must the keepers of those knowledges and ways of 
knowing be acknowledged, valued and respected. Perhaps, risk education will not only venture into new 
worlds of knowing — it is possible that it could contribute to the processes of decolonization for the 
good of all peoples. 
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